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Abstract
Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary
and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most promi-
nent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global
Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin
by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration,
etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of infor-
mation (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for
consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both
necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating
that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that
it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim
by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that
contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. More-
over, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable
to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and
argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence
indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being
conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.
Keywords Amodal completion · Attended intermediate-level representation theory ·
Attention · Consciousness · Feature integration · Global workspace theory · Illusory
contours · Information integration theory · Spatial neglect · Visual agnosia
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1 Introduction
A growing number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently argued that
informational integration should play a central role in our attempts to understand con-
scious experience. Various theories have been proposed to explain how information is
integrated in such a way as to produce conscious experiences, such as seeing a blue
square. In this paper, we will present evidence from a range of empirical studies that
casts doubt on the strength of the explanatory role information integration plays in
the consciousness debate. After discussing the relevant notions of consciousness and
information integration, we outline some of the most prominent theories of conscious-
ness that give center stage to the notion of information integration. We then present
evidence for consciousness in the absence of integration, and vice versa.
2 Representation, consciousness, and information integration
We assume that mental states are representational: that is, as a minimum, they carry
information about real-world properties and relations. When a mental state represents a
square shape as blue, for example, it carries information about blueness and squareness.
These properties are components of the mental state’s representational content.1
Human beings and other creatures are conscious when they are aware of themselves
or their environment. This sort of awareness, also known as ‘creature consciousness,’
can change gradually when, say, we are falling asleep or are getting intoxicated. It can
also change more rapidly when, for instance, a boxer gets knocked out in the ring.
Creature consciousness is commonly taken to be distinct from state consciousness
(Dretske 1993; Carruthers 1996, 2000; Lycan 1996; Block 1997; Rosenthal 1997;
Manson 2000).
State consciousness is a property of mental states that is closely tied to what the
content of the mental state makes its bearer aware of. An individual who is (seemingly)
aware of a property P is in a conscious mental state that has a content that contains
P (or a component that refers to P). Although not universally accepted, we shall here
understand creature consciousness in terms of state consciousness as follows:
Individual S is creature conscious just in case some mental state of S’s is conscious.
In this paper, we will mostly be concerned with consciousness as a property of men-
tal states. Consciousness is viewed as a great scientific challenge, in part, because it is
a phenomenon that involves subjective experiences that have a certain phenomenol-
ogy or qualitative ‘feel’ (Chalmers 1998; Bayne and Chalmers 2003). For example,
experiencing a blue square has a different phenomenology or qualitative ‘feel’ than
experiencing a red circle. Having such experiences ‘feels like something’ from a first-
person point of view. Any theory of consciousness should be able to explain why the
underlying anatomical, functional, or informational structures (or connectivity) give
1 A theory of consciousness should be able to explain the neural substrates of mental states and their
behavioral manifestations.
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rise to subjective experiences that have a certain phenomenology. Indeed, the aim of
theories we discuss in this paper is to provide this sort of explanation.
With respect to subjective experience, we take integration to be the bringing
together, or combination, of sensory information from different sources. For example,
given a normally functioning human perceptual system, information about proper-
ties such as shape, color, motion, and spatial location may be combined to yield an
integrated percept of, say, a blue square moving from left to right. When the subject
is in a mental state whose representational content conveys integrated information
about a range of properties, that state can then be said to have integrated content. Thus
understood, integration is a property of the contents of mental states.
With respect to theories of consciousness, the aim is to explain why and how certain
physical mechanisms give rise to conscious experiences. Some theoretical approaches
to consciousness that rely on information integration begin by identifying the essential
properties of subjective experience and then ask what sorts of physical mechanisms
would give rise to them (see e.g., Tononi 2004). Others start from the brain and then
ask how it could give rise to subjective experiences (see e.g., Baars 1988, 2005). As we
shall see, the notion of ‘information integration’ is used differently by proponents of
Information Integration Theories. For example, according to Giulio Tononi’s axiom of
information (2012, p. 297), each experience is specific; and according to the postulate
of information (posited to explain the above axiom) information is a “cause-effect
repertoire” (defined as “the probability distribution of potential past and future states
of a system as constraint by a mechanism in its current state”) which is integrated,
i.e., it is not reducible to its parts. For Baars and Franklin (2003), it is integrated
sensory information that enters the global workspace, which, when spotlighted, leads
to conscious experiences; and for Prinz (2012), it is the integration of intermediate-
level representations that serve as the contents of conscious experience. Although
each of these theories utilize different notions of information integration, what they
all have in common is that they tie the notion of information integration to subjective
experience. This is not surprising given that the aim of such theories of consciousness
is to explain subjective experiences in terms of the sort of information integration that
can give rise to them.
The general thesis that information integration and consciousness are deeply inter-
twined can be given a number of more specific interpretations as follows:
(A) The Identity Thesis: for a mental state to be conscious just is for it to have
integrated informational content.
(B) The Equivalence Thesis: having an integrated informational content is nec-
essary and sufficient for consciousness.
(C) The Necessity Thesis: having an integrated informational content is necessary
for consciousness.
(D) The Sufficiency Thesis: having an integrated informational content is suffi-
cient for consciousness.
Once again, it is important to keep in mind that each of the theories we discuss specifies
“integrated informational content” in its own distinctive way; here, it is used as a mere
placeholder. A and B imply C and D. We will argue that the current empirical data
indicate that consciousness can occur in the absence of informational integration, and
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that a mental state can have an integrated content without being conscious. Hence, we
will argue that theses (A) through (D) are false.
(C) and (D) can be cashed out as follows:
(C) Necessity of Integration: Necessarily, if mental state M is conscious, then
M’s informational content is integrated (C ⇒ I ).
(D) Sufficiency of Integration: Necessarily, if mental state M’s informational
content is integrated, then M is conscious (I ⇒ C).
We shall here limit ourselves to the following three theories: Information Integra-
tion Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-level
Representation Theory (AIR). All three theories hold that integration of the informa-
tional content of experience is necessary for phenomenal consciousness. In other
words, they are all committed to (C). IIT is furthermore committed to the sufficiency
of integration, as expressed by (D).
As we will argue below, there is evidence to suggest that subjects with frontal
lesions are unable to carry out simple instructions, despite appearing to understand
the meaning conveyed by such instructions. This, we argue, is irreconcilable with
GWT. While IIT arguably has the resources to accommodate these results, it appears
to fall prey to empirical evidence demonstrating the possibility of the experience of
simple features without feature integration. Moreover, by claiming that integration of
informational content is not only necessary but also sufficient for consciousness, IIT
tempts fate twice. As we will see, in hemineglect cases, content may be integrated
and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Analogous mechanisms also turn out
to underlie the phenomena of amodal completion. So, while it is quite plausible that
IIT constrains consciousness in some ways, we will argue that it doesn’t successfully
pin down its nature. Lastly, we will argue that data from visual agnosia present a
problem for AIR. The failure of agnostic patients to identify objects they report being
conscious of is sometimes based on insufficient content integration, as defined by
AIR. This suggests that integration, as construed by AIR, isn’t necessary for con-
sciousness.
3 Integration theories
In this section, we will briefly outline the specifics of the three target theories: infor-
mation integration theory, global workspace theory, and attended intermediate-level
theory.
3.1 Information integration theory (IIT)
Information Integration Theory (IIT), originally advanced by Giulio Tononi, accepts
the identity thesis (A): for a mental state to be conscious just is for it to have an
integrated content (Tononi 2004, 2008, 2010). Unlike other theories of consciousness,
IIT starts with the phenomenology of experience. Reflection on the phenomenology
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of experience yields (five) axioms (e.g., information, integration, exclusion, etc.).2
The theory then specifies the conditions a physical mechanism (e.g., neurons and their
connections) or a system (e.g., a brain) must satisfy in order to generate phenomenal
experiences (referred to as postulates).3 Whether this approach is better suited to the
study of consciousness is controversial. Bayne (2018), for example, argues that such
an axiomatic approach is not well-suited to the study of consciousness, in part, because
axioms, while closely associated with mathematics and logic, are absent in accounts
of explanation within neuroscience or psychology.
According to the axiom of information, each experience differs phenomenally from
other possible experiences (Oizumi et al. 2014). For example, an experience of a blue
square differs phenomenally from an experience of a red square. According to the
axiom of integration, each experience is irreducible to its parts (Oizumi et al. 2014).
For example, when one sees the word ‘honeymoon’, one does not perceive it as a
mere co-occurrence of two distinct experiences: an experience of the word ‘honey’
and an experience of the word ‘moon’. Rather the word ‘honeymoon’ constitutes a
single experience irreducible to the simple combination of an experience of ‘honey’
and an experience of ‘moon’ (Tononi and Koch 2015). Similarly, when looking at a
blue square, one is not simply aware of the uninstantiated blue color and an achromatic
square shape. Rather, one is aware of blue and square as instantiated together in the
same place.4 The experience of the blue square cannot be reduced to experiences of
its components, i.e., an experience of the blueness and an experience of the square-
ness.5 These examples indicate that the axiom of integration concerns representational
unity (see, e.g., Bayne and Chalmers 2003). IIT treats these axioms as fundamental
properties of experience.6
In light of the aforementioned axioms or fundamental properties of experience,
several postulates are posited to explain what kinds of physical mechanisms could
account for the phenomenology of experience. According to the two postulates of
information and integration, information is integrated when a mechanism or system
generates information not simply through the combination of its discrete components
but rather through a kind of integration that yields ‘much more’ information than
the mere combination of its parts. ITT posits that in order for a mechanism to be
able to generate experiences with specific/distinct phenomenology, it must specify
2 Bayne (2018) argues that the phenomenological axioms posited by ITT fail to capture the essential features
of every experience.
3 ITT’s postulates identify an experience with the set of all mechanisms (i.e., the “conceptual structure”)
and the maximally irreducible probability distribution of potential past and future states of a system as
informed by a mechanism in its current state (i.e., its “cause–effect repertoire. See Tononi and Koch 2015).
4 But why, one might ask, is there more information contained in the representation of a blue square at
some location L1, than there is in the representation of a color at L1 and a shape at L1? Why wouldn’t the
first representation be reducible to its parts? The reason for this seems to be that the former representation
carries the information that the color and the shape are properties of a single object (and thus their fates are
non-accidentally correlated), whereas the latter representation lacks this information.
5 IIT’s contention that the experience of a blue square has its integrated content essentially is closely tied to
the unity of consciousness: conscious unity can be understood in terms of the irreducibility of its components
(see Bayne and Chalmers 2003).
6 For arguments against this and other claims pertaining to the axioms see Bayne (2018).
123
Synthese
information (i.e., a “cause-effect repertoire”) that is not reducible to its parts (Oizumi
et al. 2014, p. 4).
On this view, consciousness is a fundamental property (as fundamental as mass or
charge) of physical systems that have (internal) causal powers that determine past and
future states, which
can be accounted for by the intrinsic cause-effect power of certain mechanisms
in a state — how they give form to the space of possibilities in their past and their
future. An analogy is mass, which can be defined by how it curves space-time
around it — except that in the case of experience the entities having the property
are not elementary particles but complexes of elements, and experience comes
not in two but in a trillion varieties. In this general sense, at least, IIT is not at
odds with panpsychism.
Although IIT may not be at odds with panpsychism, it should be distinguished from it.7
Whereas panpsychism holds that all things are conscious, IIT attributes consciousness
only to systems capable of distinguishing among alternatives (Tononi 2008). Moreover,
unlike panpsychism, IIT takes consciousness to be graded, which is to say, not all
conscious systems are conscious to the same degree.8
Since consciousness is identified with integrated information that is generated by a
mechanism or a system over and above the information generated by its parts, it can be
quantified. A mathematical quantity, ϕ, which is, at least in principle, measurable, is
thus used by proponents of IIT to quantify consciousness (Oizumi et al. 2014; Tononi
2004, 2008). The idea is that a mechanism or a system that has higher ϕ will produce
more conscious states than a mechanism or a system that has a lower ϕ. For example, a
particular quality of an experience such as the blueness of a square is generated by the
integration of information at the substrate level. The fact that the experience of a blue
square has a distinctive phenomenology than, say, an experience of a green square is
expressed by its ϕ value. This value measures consciousness by measuring whether a
mechanism or a system causes specific experiences when it integrates information.
3.2 Global workspace theory (GWT)
Global Workspace Theory (GWT), originally proposed by Bernard Baars, accepts
thesis (C) but rejects (D). It thus maintains that information integration is necessary but
not sufficient for consciousness (Baars 1988, 1997, 2002). On this view, integration
requires more than a unification of sensory information originating from different
sources. In order for sensory information to become integrated in the way required by
7 For discussions of panpsychism see, e.g. Chalmers (2015), Strawson (2006), and papers in Brüntrup and
Jaskolla (2016).
8 One might wonder how IIT would account for experiences in different sensory modalities that pick out
the same feature of a given object. Consider, for example, the case of seeing and holding a ball. The visual
and tactile experiences of the ball’s spherical shape have different phenomenal characters. How would IIT
account for this difference in phenomenology, given that both experiences pick out a spherical shape? One
way for IIT to accommodate this sort of phenomenal difference is to take the shared feature to be integrated
differently in the different sensory modalities or submodalities. For example, the sphericality of the ball
may be taken to be integrated in a visual way in one case but in a tactile way in the other (for a similar
solution to the general problem, sometimes referred to as ‘Molyneux’s question’, see Chalmers 2004).
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GWT, it needs to be broadcast to an executive cognitive system referred to as the ‘global
workspace’ (Baars 1988, 1997, 2002; Franklin and Graesser 1997; Dehaene et al. 2006;
Dehaene and Changeux 2011).9 Global workspace is a working memory system for
temporarily storing and managing information required to carry out complex cognitive
tasks such as decision-making, reporting and complex problem solving (Baars 1988,
1997, 2002; Franklin and Graesser 1997; Dehaene et al. 2006; Baars and Franklin 2009;
Dehaene and Changeux 2011). ‘Broadcast’ here is a term of art. In order for information
to be broadcast to global workspace, it does not suffice that it is available for use in
cognitive tasks, if by ‘available’ we simply mean availability for potential encoding
in working memory. All of the information from specialized motor, perceptual and
cognitive subsystems, or ‘modules’ that is needed for a given cognitive task must be
stored, or encoded, together in working memory. This sort of encoding ensures that
information from different sources is combined in the way that is required for carrying
out a given cognitive task. As Stanislas Dehaene and Lionel Naccache put it:
Through the workspace, modular systems that do not directly exchange infor-
mation in an automatic mode can nevertheless gain access to each other’s
content. The global workspace thus provides a common ‘communication proto-
col’ through which a particularly large potential for the combination of multiple
input, output, and internal systems becomes available (Dehaene and Naccache
2001, p. 13).
To see this, suppose you are a research participant saddled with the task of pressing a
button only when you both hear a sharp tone and see a blob with soft edges. In order
to complete the task correctly, you will need to encode the information contained in
the instruction as well as the information provided to you visually and auditorily. On
the basis of those informational inputs, you will need to make a cognitive decision
about whether or not to press the button. If you are unable to make such a decision
on the basis of the information you have received from the different sources, then
the information from these different sources is not encoded in a way that makes it
useful for completing the relevant task. The information in this case is not sufficiently
integrated for it to become conscious.
While encoding in working memory is necessary for consciousness to arise, it is
not sufficient. For the encoded information to reach consciousness, it must also be
amplified by selective attention (Baars leaves open the possibility that additional con-
ditions are necessary for consciousness) (Dehaene et al. 1998; Dehaene and Naccache
2001; Posner 1994; Posner and Dehaene 1994). Only information that is broadcast
to working memory in combined form and is amplified by selective attention has the
potential to reach the level of consciousness.
To shed light on the claim that both encoding and amplification are needed in order
for sensory information to become consciousness, defenders of GWT employ a theater
metaphor (Baars 1997). Consciousness arises when a ‘spotlight of selective attention’
9 The global workspace cannot be associated with a fixed set of brain areas because various cortical areas
can contain workspace neurons with suitable long-distance and widespread connectivity needed to give rise
to conscious experiences. However, the fact that workspace neurons seem to be denser in certain areas such
as the prefrontal cortices (PFC) and the anterior cingulate (AC) suggests that these areas play a dominant
role in the function of the global workspace.
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lights up a specific portion of the stage. The actors, their actions, and the scene props
(information) that are illuminated by the narrow, intense beam of light constitute the
visible activities that contribute to the overall narrative (conscious content). The theater
personnel, such as the director (executive processes), the playwrights, scene designers,
and choreographers are in charge of what becomes visible on the stage, but they are
not themselves visible.
GWT’s requirement that attention is needed for consciousness is somewhat
dubitable if one holds that phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness actu-
ally come apart (Block 1995).10 However, this requirement is far less contentious
given the assumption underlying GWT, namely that consciousness simply is access
consciousness.11
Another worry about GWT, raised by Jesse Prinz (2012, pp. 29–31), is based on
GWT’s claim that working memory can contain information that isn’t amplified by
attention and therefore isn’t conscious. The problem with this claim, Prinz argues,
is that it requires that attention operate on higher-order information already stored in
working memory. Yet, he argues, there is no evidence to suggest that attention amplifies
information stored in working memory. Rather, the evidence strongly indicates that
when we attend to things in the external world, attention alters the content of the
corresponding perceptual states.
However, there is a fairly simple reply to this worry. Recent evidence seems to
support a distinction between working memory proper and fragile working memory,
at least in the case of visual experience (Neisser 1967; Vogel et al. 2001; Sligte et al.
2008). Fragile visual working memory is an intermediate form of visual working
memory that is thought to last longer than iconic memory but not as long as visual
working memory. When information is processed by the visual system, it is first
stored in iconic memory. From there it enters fragile visual working memory and then
visual working memory. Information stored in fragile visual working memory is only
potentially available for use in cognitive tasks. Given the distinction made by Block
(1995) between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, information in
fragile visual working memory may be phenomenally conscious but it is not access
conscious. Barring this distinction (and going along with GWT),12 information in
fragile visual working memory is not conscious and therefore needs to be amplified by
attention in order for it to enter visual working memory and thereby become conscious.
10 Block (1995, p. 234) argues that there is a natural use of ‘consciousness’ and ‘awareness’ corresponding
to ‘access consciousness’ and ‘phenomenal consciousness’, respectively. According to Block, phenomenal
consciousness can be understood as awareness, whereas access consciousness is better understood as con-
sciousness proper. When a content is both P- and A-conscious, Block suggests that we speak of ‘conscious
awareness’.
11 Raffone and Pantani (2010) propose a variant on GWT that purports to accommodate Block’s (1995)
distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.
12 Many of those who agree that there is a meaningful distinction to be drawn between phenomenal and
access consciousness argue that the two do not actually come apart. David Chalmers (1997), for example,
argues that while phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, as defined by Block (1995), coincide
(i.e., are both present or both absent in the actual world), it is conceivable and, therefore, possible that they
come apart. His view supports those like Baars and Prinz who take P-consciousness and A-consciousness
to coincide.
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Fig. 1 On Marrs’ view, which is similar to Prinz’s, the pattern of light hitting the retina first gives rise to a
low-level representation of blobs and edges, or what Marr calls ‘the primal sketch’ (the edge image) (also
sometimes referred to as ‘retinotopic representation’). From this representation, a 2½-D sketch is generated.
This serves as the input to the viewpoint-independent 3D model of the object (here intentionally distorted
in such a way to be shown from the viewer’s perspective)
Thus, given the evidentially supported distinction between fragile working memory
and working memory proper, Prinz’s worry does not present a challenge for GWT.
3.3 Attended intermediate-level representation theory (AIR)
The attended intermediate-level representation theory of consciousness (AIR),
advocated by Prinz (2000, 2012), holds that conscious experiences are attended
intermediate-level representations. Intermediate-level representations differ from low-
level and high-level representations in several ways. Low-level representations
represent local features of a stimulus, such as edges or contours, in a disunified, two-
dimensional way. High-level representations represent abstract viewpoint-independent
features of three-dimensional objects that are generated by abstracting away from the
vantage point of view and surface details. Intermediate-level representations, by con-
trast, represent objects and the features they instantiate from the perceiver’s point of
view. Because they reflect the retinal imprint (when veridical) yet capture information
about Gestalt grouping, e.g., depth and orientation, which are also referred to as ‘2½-D
sketches’ in David Marr’s (1982) terminology (see Fig. 1).
According to AIR, only representations that occur at the intermediate level have the
sort of integration needed for them to become available to working memory. Attention,
which Prinz takes to have a neural correlate in a pattern of neural oscillation known as
‘gamma waves’, is a modulation of the intermediate-level representations that makes
them available for encoding in working memory. Attention is thus a ‘gateway’ to
working memory (Prinz 2012, p. 334). Encoding in working memory, Prinz argues,
just is the subjectively experienced maintenance of information over a brief time
interval. As he puts it:
The simplest explanation for this [intimate relationship between attention and
working memory] is an identity claim: attention can be identified with the pro-
cesses that allow information to be encoded in working memory. When a stimulus
is attended, it becomes available to working memory, and if it is unattended, it
is unavailable (Prinz 2012, p. 93)
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The reason only intermediate-level representations can serve as the contents of con-
scious experience, according to Prinz, is that the low-level representations of ‘oriented
edges, bars, ends, and blobs’ that are first generated by the visual system are too
disunified to carry any meaning, whereas the high-level representations of viewpoint-
independent objects fail to capture what we are aware of when we have a conscious
experience (Prinz 2012, 50 ff; see also Prinz 2000).13 For example, when you are
looking at a quarter viewed at an angle, you can thereby come to know that the quarter
is disk-shaped but it does not show up as disk-shaped in your conscious experience.
Rather, it shows up as elliptical. Prinz argues that perceptual constancies, such as the
disk-shape of the quarter, are not presented in sensory experience. If we experience the
quarter from atop, it looks circular-shaped (or round), but not disk-shaped. However,
we can infer that the quarter is disk-shaped on the basis of past experiences of quarters
from many different perspectives.
Since attention is the processes that allow information to be encoded in work-
ing memory, on Prinz’s view, consciousness essentially involves attention (Prinz
2000, 2012). Attention makes intermediate-level representations available for poten-
tial encoding in working memory, which suffices for them to become conscious (Prinz
2012, p. 106).14 But, Prinz argues, empirical evidence suggests that no actual encod-
ing is necessary (Prinz 2012, pp. 99–102). This can be seen from cases of change
blindness. Change blindness, which has been demonstrated to occur in real-world
interactions, involves a failure to detect changes in a scene (Ballard et al. 1994). In
one famous experiment, subjects failed to notice that the person (A) they were giving
directions to on the street had been replaced with a different person (B) after a tem-
porary distraction created by carrying a mirror or a door between the subject and A
(Simons and Levin 1998). This indicates that while the subject had separate experi-
ences of A and B, the information pertaining to the change from A to B failed to be
encoded in working memory. As a result, the subject failed to notice that she was no
longer talking to A. Prinz argues that while the change from A to B is not actually
encoded in working memory, the fact that the subject experienced both people makes
this information available for recall (provided that the research participant was asked
immediately after viewing). This indicates that what’s needed here is availability to
working memory, not actual encoding in working memory.
Because GWT takes consciousness to require actual encoding in working memory,
whereas AIR merely requires availability for encoding, Prinz (2012) notes that AIR
could be understood as a dispositional version of GWT. As he puts it:
13 In the case of vision, the intermediate level is anatomically located in a family of areas involved in
processing color (hue), motion and three-dimensional shape (extra-striate brain regions). By comparison,
the lower level is anatomically located in primary visual cortex (V1) and some subcortical structures such
as the visual nuclei of the thalamus and the superior colliculus; the high level recruits structures in inferior
temporal areas (such as TE, TEO, and sections of the superior temporal sulcus), the lateral occipital complex,
and some structures in parietal cortex (such as the ventral and posterior inter-parietal areas).
14 Note that, on this view, high-level representations are used to mediate encoding once an attended item
has been selected for use in cognitive tasks or for retention in long-term memory, but Prinz argues, high-level
representations are not themselves modulated by attention and therefore do not themselves reach conscious
awareness (Prinz 2012).
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The AIR theory might be described as a dispositional global workspace theory,
although there is one empirical issue that would need to be resolved before that
claim could stick (Prinz 2012, p. 335).
The issue that would ‘need to be resolved’, Prinz says, is that of whether conscious-
ness would break down if individuals with brain lesions could use stored information
directly for cognitive tasks without global broadcasting (Prinz 2012, p. 335).
Setting aside this issue, AIR and GWT agree that integration is facilitated by atten-
tion. The main difference between AIR and GWT is that the latter takes integration be
the result of actual encoding in working memory, whereas the former takes integration
to happen at the intermediate level of processing and consciousness to happen when the
information becomes available to working memory. Since attentional amplification is
required in order for intermediate-level representations to reach conscious awareness,
on Prinz’s view, integration is a precondition for consciousness to arise.
4 Integration is not necessary for consciousness
Having provided an overview of each of the target theories, we now turn to the question
of whether information integration is necessary for consciousness. As stated above,
the necessity thesis (C) can be articulated as follows:
(C) Necessity of Integration: Necessarily, if mental state M is conscious, then
M’s representational content is integrated (C ⇒ I ).
According to C, having an integrated content is necessary for consciousness. So, if
there are cases of conscious mental states that fail to have integrated content, then (C)
is false. In the next section we will look at empirical findings that suggest that feature
awareness can occur without feature integration. This possibility presents a coun-
terexample to thesis (C). We begin by discussing some empirical results that appear
to create trouble for IIT. We provide evidence against GWT and AIR in subsequent
sections.
4.1 Evidence against IIT from failures of feature integration
Different parts of the perceptual system are sensitive to different features of the envi-
ronment such as shape, motion, luminance, and color. The information about these
features from different sources needs to be combined to yield the familiar representa-
tions of our environment as filled with stable, coherent objects. The question of how
the perceptual system manages to produce unified representations of this kind has
become known as the ‘binding problem’ (see, e.g., Hardcastle 1994; Treisman 1996;
Hummel 2001; Bayne and Chalmers 2003; Bayne 2010).
Investigations into how to solve the binding problem have yielded a sizable body
of research, including discussions of binding failures; that is, cases where the normal
processes of combining distinct types of information about different features fail.
Such failures of feature integration take different forms. In one type of failure, distinct
features are mismatched. For example, when subjects were presented with, say, a green
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Fig. 2 The set of relevant targets to be reported, i.e., red items, Os, or red Os, was specified immediately
after the display was presented. Adopted from Treisman (2006)
letter O and a red letter T, some reported seeing ‘illusory conjunctions’ of red Os and
green Ts (see e.g., Robertson et al. 1997; Cohen and Ivry 1989; Robertson 2003).
Such failures do not challenge IIT since these subjects are still aware of the illusory
conjunction of distinct features, even though these features are mismatched. This is
not the only way for feature integration to fail, however.
As illustrated by the studies discussed below, subjects can sometimes detect several
features of the same object independently of each other. For example, they may detect
color but not extension, or vice versa. Conscious awareness of isolated features that are
unbound appears to present a counterexample to IIT. This is because IIT is committed
to the claim that conscious experience cannot exhibit this kind of disintegration (as
indicated by its axioms). As Tononi (2004) writes,
The integration of information in conscious experience is evident phenomeno-
logically: when you consciously ‘see’ a certain image, that image is experienced
as an integrated whole and cannot be subdivided into component images that
are experienced independently. For example, no matter how hard you try, you
cannot experience colors independently of shapes, or the left half of the visual
field of view independently of the right half (Tononi 2004, eprint pub.).
However, the experience of colors independently of shapes and of colors independently
of orientation is precisely what the next two studies show can happen.
For starters, Anne Treisman’s experiments on feature binding appear to show that
we are aware of features in a scene prior to being aware of how they are bound
together. In other words, subjects were found to be aware of features in the scene
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Fig. 3 Examples of two displays with equal numbers of each target type but different numbers of various
conjunctions. The display in a has 36% blue Xs but the display in b has none. Adopted from Treisman
(2006)
before they were being integrated (bound) as features of different objects (Treisman
2006). Subjects were presented with brief displays of colored letters, i.e., O, X, and
T in red, green and blue, and were asked to estimate what proportion of the stimulus
was, for instance, red, or Os, or red Os. The experimenter post-cued which feature
or conjunction was relevant. On each trial, the stimulus was presented for 500 ms
followed by a 500 ms of a blank screen before a single color patch or a single white
letter or a single colored letter was used as a probe (Fig. 2). Subjects were asked to
report what proportion of the display a particular feature or conjunction represented
(Fig. 3). The results indicated that subjects ‘were good at judging the proportions of
the separate features that were present, but very poor at judging the proportions of
conjunctions’ (Treisman 2006; emphasis added).
These results suggest that the participants were conscious of features such as colors
and shapes separately, as suggested by their accurate estimations of proportions of each
feature in a scene. However, they did not seem to be conscious of combined colors
and shapes, as evidenced by their poor estimation of the proportion of conjunctions of
features. These results present a challenge for the IIT. Recall that, according to the IIT,
one of the essential properties of consciousness is that it is unified (Tononi 2012; Tononi
and Koch 2015). As a consequence, you should not be able to experience, say, colors
independently of shapes, ‘no matter how hard you try’ (Tononi 2004, eprint pub.). Yet,
these results indicate that such unbound experiences can occur. This, in turn, shows
that the axioms posited by IIT fail to adequately capture the actual phenomenology
of experience; and along with them the corresponding postulates that are posited to
explain the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenology of experience.
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It may be objected that IIT does not entail that colors (generally speaking) cannot
be seen independently of shapes as Treisman’s experiments seem to indicate. Rather,
the theory maintains that the features of a single stimulus (say, a blue square) can
only be experienced as an integrated whole. However, as we have argued, Treisman’s
experiments show the opposite: namely, subjects did not experience the features of
a single image as an integrated whole. For while subjects were shown two distinct
displays, these displays contained exactly the same proportions of the different features
(half blue letters, half Xs, a quarter each red letters, green letters, Ts, and Os). The only
difference between the two displays was that the features were differently bound: one
display had 33% blue Xs and other had none. Yet, the judgments subjects made about
feature proportions and proportions for bound objects differed significantly in their
accuracy. This suggests that the subjects’ experiences served much better as sources of
evidence for estimating the proportions of unbound features than they did as sources of
evidence for estimating the proportions of bound features. It seems natural to locate the
reason for this difference in the experiences’ phenomenology. There was something
it was like for the subjects to experience unbound features, and there was nothing it
was like for the subjects to experience bound features. This explains the more accurate
report about the unbound features and the less accurate report about the bound features.
The proponent of IIT may nevertheless insist that the differences in the subjects’
responses do not present a problem for IIT because either the nature of the task influ-
enced what subjects experienced or it influenced how subjects directed their attention.
However, neither of these explanations are applicable to Treisman’s experiments since
the subjects were given the task instructions after they were shown the target displays.
It seems unlikely, then, that the nature of the task altered what they experienced or how
they attended to the experience itself. Moreover, Treisman notes that these differences
cannot be attributed to changes in focused attention (which involves conscious access
to stimuli with bound features in their current locations) because the subjects deployed
global attention (which involves global and statistical properties of the general layout
of a scene).15
In another study, conducted by Neri and Levi (2006), subjects were shown an
array of rectangular segments. Each segment could be either horizontally or vertically
oriented, and each could be either dark or bright in color. The subjects were then
asked to report whenever they saw an array where (1) one segment had different
color, regardless of orientation (e.g., a dark segment among bright segments); (2) one
segment had a different orientation, regardless of color (e.g., a horizontal segment
among vertical segments); and (3) one segment had a different orientation and color
compared to the rest (e.g., a horizontal dark segment among vertical bright segments)
(Fig. 4). The arrays were presented for 150 ms to avoid saccades. The detection
threshold is taken to be the size of the colored segments at which over 82% of the
subjects’ answers were correct.
When the arrays were presented to the fovea (i.e., in the center of the visual field),
detection thresholds for orientation and for orientation-and-color were the same. The
subjects were as good at determining which of the segments was the odd-one-out by
orientation alone as they were at determining the same thing by the combination of
15 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these objections.
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Fig. 4 This figure represents example stimuli. a The orientation discrimination task: Non-targets (left) con-
tain segments of the same orientation while targets (right) contain 1 segment of different orientation. b Uses
the same idea for color discrimination. c The conjunction task: here non-targets and targets were equated
in overall color and orientation content. Adopted from Neri and Levi (2006)
color and orientation (color alone is not mentioned because detection thresholds for
color are lower than detection thresholds for orientation).
But when the stimuli were presented in peripheral vision, detection thresholds
for orientation-and-color were much higher than detection thresholds for orientation
alone (meaning that the combination was much more difficult for the subjects to
detect than individual features). This suggests that there are cases in which each of
the two features (color and orientation) is visible separately but they are not visible
in combination. At the very least, there are cases where the subjects can discriminate
the color of the stimulus and the orientation of the stimulus separately but cannot
discriminate the combination of color and orientation. In this case, feature integration
appears to be an obstacle to consciousness, which goes against the claims made by
advocates of IIT. Again, these findings indicate that the axioms posited by IIT fail to
adequately capture the actual phenomenology of experience; and along with them the
corresponding postulates that are posited to explain the underlying mechanisms of the
phenomenology of experience.
Our interpretation of the results assumes that verbal reports from study participants
indicate that they were phenomenally conscious of what they reported. While the issue
of the connection between reportability and consciousness is fraught with controversy,
we do think it is relatively uncontroversial to assume that report is good evidence
for consciousness. Moreover, the length of time for which stimuli were presented in
both studies described above (150 ms in the Neri and Levi study and 500 ms in the
Treisman study), gives us further confidence that the stimuli were indeed consciously
perceived. This is because there is empirical evidence that stimuli presented for much
shorter periods are likely to be consciously processed by subjects (Pins and Ffytche
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2003). While, admittedly, it could be the case that experience outstrips report in both
studies we cite, the onus is on the proponents of IIT to explain why we should not
take subjective reports at face value. Tononi and Koch (2015) argue that behavior can
be misleading and cite cases in which a person may sleepwalk or be unresponsive.
Although we agree that such case reports can be misleading, there is nothing so
alarming in these experimental conditions that would lead us to outright dismiss their
veracity. For we are dealing with responsive adult humans who are fully capable of
understanding the experimenter’s instructions as opposed to, say, unresponsive adults,
infants, or animals.16
To summarize: Treisman’s (2006) study indicates that unity (in Tononi’s sense)
need not apply to all conscious experiences. Recall that the accurate estimations of
proportions of each feature in the scene indicated that the subjects were conscious of
features such as colors and shapes separately. At the same time, the poor estimation
of the proportion of conjunctions of features indicated that subjects did not appear
to be conscious of color and shape simultaneously. Similarly, in the Neri and Levi
(2006) study, detecting the combination of orientation and color in peripheral vision
was more difficult than detecting either orientation on its own or color on its own.
In other words, detection thresholds for orientation-and-color were much higher than
detection thresholds for orientation alone. This suggests, in line with the authors’ own
conclusion, that each of the two features (color and orientation) were experienced
separately but not in combination. It follows that, contrary to IIT’s axioms, subjects
did not have a unified experience of color-and-orientation (or color-and-form) but
rather an experience of color and an experience of orientation (or form).
Recall that IIT’s approach to the question of consciousness is the opposite of the
approach that is typically taken in neuroscience. IIT first posits a set of axioms that
describe the phenomenology of experience as primary. It then posits a set of postulates
that purport to explain how these phenomenological axioms can be implemented by
physical mechanisms. But if the axioms fail to adequately capture the phenomenology
of experience, then the postulates will also fail to capture how they are implemented
by the brain.
4.2 Evidence against GWT from failures of global broadcast
As long as we take the subjects’ performance (i.e., forced-choice guesses or reporta-
bility) to genuinely reflect what the subjects are conscious of, it is difficult to see
how the above studies present a challenge to GWT. Indeed, some proponents of GWT
maintain that conscious experience must be evaluated by subjective measures, i.e.,
16 As an anonymous reviewer noted, proponents of IIT could insist that these subjective reports should not
be taken at face value because the  is maximal at posterior parts of the brain. Since the frontal activity
associated with reportability is not part of the neural correlates of consciousness, reportability is suspect as
a guide to the phenomenology of experience. However, this objection seems misguided. Our claim is not
that reportability is part of conscious experience but rather that conscious experience is, in the good cases,
accurately reportable. If IIT rejects this claim, then it is unclear what sort of evidence it can provide (apart
from reportability) for the claim that its axioms govern the phenomenology of experience. If proponents of
IIT claim instead that the Treisman cases are not “good” for whatever reason, but that report does generally
serve as a guide to phenomenology (especially when it comes to their axioms), then the latter claim, given
the disassociation between frontal activity and consciousness, starts seeming exceedingly mysterious.
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reportability (Dehaene et al. 2006).17 So if all that the subjects experience in those
cases are disembodied colors and colorless shapes, then it follows from GWT that
this information (i.e., disembodied colors and colorless shapes) will be broadcast to
different parts of the cognitive system.
GWT is not immune to criticism, however. A study conducted by Baddeley and
Wilson (1988) lends support to the view that there could be conscious experiences
whose content is not properly integrated, because it is unavailable for use by the
subject’s cognitive system. Baddeley and Wilson studied patient R.J. who suffered
from frontal lobe lesions which resulted in serious deficits in cognitive functioning
tasks. In one of the tests conducted by the experimenters, R.J. was tasked to complete
a very simple 12-piece jigsaw puzzle. The researchers describe his performance as
follows:
[R.J.] was consistently held up at particular points, often taking a piece that the
picture indicated could not possibly fit in a given location, and systematically
changing its orientation in the hope that it would fit. The problem appeared to be
one of strategy, indicating both an apparent failure to be able to take account of
information from two sources such as shape and pattern simultaneously, and a
tendency to perseverate in the attempt to fit a piece in the wrong place. (Baddeley
and Wilson 1988, pp. 221–223, emphasis added)
In contrast to the first two studies, there is no independent indication in this study that
the aberrant observations are the result of disturbances or abnormalities to the proper
function of the visual system. Since R.J.’s visual experience of the chosen piece and
the piece required by the picture was not aberrant, he must have seen the pattern
and shape of the chosen piece as well as the pattern and shape of the piece required
by the picture. Yet he was unable to use the visual information to solve the puzzle.
The most plausible reason for this seems to be that the visually provided information
failed to combine when it was broadcast to executive areas. Recall that GWT holds that
integration of the sort that gives rise to consciousness consists in the actual encoding of
the information in global workspace. But this requires that the information is available
for use in cognitive tasks such as reporting, decision making, or problem solving.
This case presents a challenge for GWT. R.J. appears to have a conscious experience
of the piece in his hand as well as the location he is instructed to fit it into. Yet the
content of his experience is not jointly encoded in global workspace, which would
be needed for it to be available for use in cognitive tasks such as fitting the piece in
the right place. It follows that this is a case of consciousness in the absence of proper
integration.
In another study, conducted by Konow and Pribram (1970), patient I.S. who suffered
frontal lobe damage was asked to draw simple shapes on the basis of the experimenters’
verbal instruction. I.S. was unable to follow the instructions correctly: on one occasion,
when asked to draw a square, she kept on drawing circular shapes; on another, she
drew an A-shape in response to almost any instruction. I.S. understood the content
17 While objective measures typically involve asking subjects to make forced-choice guesses about what
they have seen, subjective measures typically involve reportability (Szczepanowski and Pessoa 2007; Kuni-
moto et al. 2001). When subjects are asked to report on whether they saw a stimulus, negative responses
are taken as evidence that the stimulus was not experienced consciously.
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of the instruction was: she would, for instance, make remarks to the effect that she
immediately recognized that she had made an error (despite the persistent inability to
correct it). Moreover, she was also able to notice when someone else made an error
of the same sort (e.g., drawing a circle in a response to being instructed to draw a
square). Her verbal behavior, therefore, demonstrated that the inability to follow the
instructions was not the result of a failure to understand the instructions. Rather, the
observations indicate that her drawing deficits resulted from a failure to integrate the
content of the instruction with the representation of the shape she ends up drawing.
This runs counter to what GWT predicts. Although I.S. fails to use the instructions
correctly, she is nonetheless conscious of their content. She is also conscious of the
circular shapes she is drawing. It follows that, contrary to GWT, integration is not
necessary for consciousness; if it were, we would expect I.S. not to be conscious of
the content of the instructions, the content of the drawings, or both.
Proponents of GWT might argue that because the content of the instructions and
the shape I.S. sets out to draw are not unified, there isn’t a single experience with a
content that lacks integration but rather two conscious experiences each of which is
integrated. However, this reply is not available to defenders of GWT since they deny
that unification plays a role in individuating experiences. Co-consciousness of the
contents suffices for there to be a single experience. Yet the contents of that conjoint
experience are not integrated in such a way as to be available for use in the requested
cognitive task. Hence, contrary to what GWT implies, the content is not integrated in
a way that suffices for it to reach conscious awareness.
Defenders of GWT may attempt to refute the objection in a different way. They
might argue that while I.S. clearly represents the shapes she eventually draws, it is in
no way obvious that she has a conscious experience of those shapes. After all, action is
guided by motor representations in the vision for action stream, and there is evidence
that these motor representations are not conscious (Milner and Goodale 1995). Suppose
you reach to and grasp a coffee cup on your desk. In order to grasp the cup effortlessly
you must rely on a conscious experience of the cup and its location but the motor
representations that ultimately guide your action must represent various additional
features of the situation, including the hand aperture needed for you to successfully
grasp the cup and the force you must apply to lift the cup. Nevertheless, you don’t sit
down and calculate the required hand aperture and muscle force before reaching for the
cup. It may thus be argued that these other aspects are not available to consciousness.
Since the vision-guided motor representations are not available to consciousness, it
may be further argued that she does not have a conscious experience of the shapes
she sets out to draw. It follows that there isn’t a single conscious experience without
integrated content.
While this sort of move may hold some promise for the defender of GWT, it doesn’t
ultimately succeed. As Milner and Goodale (1995) have argued, action on the fly is
governed by unconscious motor representations in the sensorimotor cortex in the
vision-for-action stream (see also Goodale et al. 1991; Goodale and Milner 1992; Hu
and Goodale 2000; Westwood and Goodale 2003). Everyday actions like reaching for
your coffee cup, eating with a knife and fork, using a computer mouse, riding your bike,
and parking your car on a busy street are not typically preceded by careful planning
(Brogaard 2011b; Brogaard and Gatzia 2017). Yet when an action is planned ahead of
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time, as in the case of following a recipe, playing darts, or making a move in a game
of chess, a conscious representation of the planned action helps us execute the action
as planned (Brogaard 2011b). Not all drawing activities are based on careful planning,
of course. Doodles are, by definition, an excellent example of an action carried out on
the fly. But many other kinds of drawing seem to be the result of planning. Arguably
drawing isn’t altogether different in this respect from completing a JigSaw puzzle.
Putting down a piece on the table isn’t an action done on the fly but rather an action
that you intend to align with the outcome of your prior deliberation. I.S. was indeed
given ample time to plan her drawing but failed owing to the lack of integration
of the information from the different sources. These considerations suggest that I.S.
does indeed have a conscious experience composed of an experience the represents
the shape she is asked to draw and an experience that guides her when drawing the
shapes she actually draws. As the components of the content of the experience are not
integrated, this case presents a problem for GWT.
Yet another avenue for the proponents of GWT to respond would be to suggest that
while the information about what shape to draw is available for use in the drawing task,
the failure to carry out the instruction correctly is caused by some fault in the system
consuming this information after it has been made available for use. If this were the
case, I.S. would no longer constitute a counterexample to GWT, as the proponents of
the theory could still claim that the information about what shape to draw is conscious
but I.S.’s inability to draw it doesn’t show the information is not available for other
systems. The failure to carry out the instruction could be attributed to some fault in
the processing downstream from integration.
However, as Pribram and Konow report, I.S. is able to draw the requisite shape if
instructed to copy a shape she is shown. This suggests that there is nothing wrong with
the system consuming integrated information for use in the drawing task. Rather, it
remains plausible that the essence of I.S.’s problem lies in the content of the verbal
instruction failing to be made available for use in the first place.
4.3 Evidence against AIR from failure of shape and depth perception
Recall that AIR holds that consciousness occurs when and only when an inte-
grated intermediate-level representation is made available to working memory by
being attentionally amplified. While attentional attenuation is necessary and sufficient
for consciousness, integration of information into a 2½-D sketch is only necessary.
This kind of integration is necessary, according to AIR, because low-level repre-
sentations lack meaning, whereas high-level representations are too abstract and
subject-independent to be able to serve as the content of subjective experience.
AIR is not subject to the problems that threaten to undermine IIT and GWT. Since
AIR doesn’t require only availability for encoding, not actual encoding in working
memory for consciousness to arise, it avoids the above objections to GWT. Like IIT,
AIR requires integration of low-level features for consciousness to arise. However,
Prinz maintains that the notions of integration and binding should be kept apart (Prinz
2012, p. 40). Feature binding can fail when stimuli are presented very quickly to
subjects or are presented in the periphery of their visual field (Treisman 2006). In
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Fig. 5 Examples of illusory contours owing to Gestalt grouping by similarity in texture stimuli. Despite
being consciously aware of the stimuli, D.F. was unable to perceive the illusory contours resulting from the
Gestalt groupings (Milner et al. 1991)
such cases, subjects may only become aware of the color or the shape of the object
or location. Feature binding can also fail as a result of lesions to the posterior part of
the visual cortex and/or regions of the temporal lobe, as is seen in patients with visual
form agnosia (Prinz 2012, p. 40). But, according to Prinz, while feature binding fails
in these cases, the content of the object representation is sufficiently integrated for it
to be become available to working memory and thereby acquire consciousness. As
these experiences have integrated content, failure of feature binding does not present
a problem for AIR.
There is, nevertheless, reason to question Prinz’s claim that the content of patients
with visual form agnosia is integrated. Milner et al. (1991) studied visual agnosia
patient D.F., who had permanent lesions to the lateral visual cortex after recovering
from carbon monoxide poisoning. In spite of the lesions, she retained the ability to
consciously perceive brightness and hue but had a significant deficit in shape percep-
tion, which resulted in a failure of object recognition. She also had a reduced ability
to perceive brightness and motion. Her deficit in shape processing was caused by
an inability to perceive boundary shape and orientation, whether conveyed by color,
intensity, depth, motion, proximity, good continuity, or similarity. For example, she
was unable to perceive Gestalt grouping by similarity in texture stimuli, as illustrated
by Fig. 5.
Milner et al. (1991) argue that D.F.’s inability to perceive boundary shape and
orientation, regardless of how these boundaries were conveyed, shows that her deficit
doesn’t arise because of an inability to detect local edge differences on the basis of
luminance contrast. Rather, it reflects a failure to integrate local differences into a
global whole.
So despite her conscious experience of color and local edge features, D.F. was
unable to integrate these features into a 2½-D sketch or intermediate-level representa-
tion in Prinz’s terminology. The fact that D.F. was able to describe her experiences of
colors and local edges shows that the primal sketch (or low-level representation) was
made available to working memory through attentional modulation, thereby acquiring
consciousness. This finding goes against Prinz’s claim that only intermediate-level rep-
resentations, which occur between low-level representations and abstract 3D models,
can become conscious when modulated by attention.
In another study, Turnbull et al. (2004) examined a patient, D.M., who suffered
from visual agnosia following a closed head injury from a car accident three years
prior to testing. The brain lesions had resulted in an impairment of recognizing drawn
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Fig. 6 a One ‘possible’ and one ‘impossible’ figure was shown to DM. b Two figures that both could be
‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ were then presented to DM. Adopted from Turnbull et al. (2004)
objects that was caused by a failure to derive the appropriate three-dimensional struc-
ture from the pictorial depth-cues in two-dimensional images. In spite of the lesions,
D.M.’s ability to obtain two-dimensional information from the images such as 2D
shape, brightness, acuity, color, and motion enabled him to complete tasks that merely
required relying on the images’ two-dimensional structure. Yet owing to the failure of
depth perception, he was unable to complete tasks that required extracting depth cues
from the images.
In one 3D discrimination task, D.M. was presented with one ‘possible’ and one
‘impossible’ line drawing as shown in Fig. 6a and told that he would see two drawings
‘one of which is a good drawing, while one is a bad drawing that doesn’t make sense
if you look closely’. Using a forced-choice paradigm (an objective measure), he was
then asked to select the ‘bad’ drawing by pointing to it in a series of ten trials during
which the position of the correct item was varied.
In a 2D control task, D.M. was presented with pairs of drawings (Fig. 6) that in
one half of the trials were both possible or both impossible (Fig. 6b) and in the other
half consisted of one possible and one impossible figure (Fig. 6a). In the control task,
D.M. was asked to determine whether the drawings were the ‘same’ or ‘different’,
regardless of whether they were possible or impossible.
D.M. fared no better than chance in the 3D possible-impossible discrimination
trials but answered correctly in the 2D control trials. As the 2D task can be completed
without extracting three-dimensional structure from the drawn objects, these results
show that D.M. had cognitive access to two-dimensional information about the drawn
objects but was unable to extract information about their three-dimensional structure.
D.M.’s deficits in depth perception made him unable to derive three-dimensional
structure from line drawings presented to him. While the 2D features D.M. obtained
from the drawings were not integrated into a 2½-D sketch, the study shows that they
were nonetheless available to working memory. The study thus demonstrates that
low-level information can acquire consciousness, contrary to what AIR predicts.
Further evidence for DM’s failure of depth perception came from the fact that
unlike normal perceivers, he wasn’t susceptible to the Ponzo and Müller–Lyer illusions
(Fig. 7). In the Ponzo illusion, the line at the top appears to be longer than the line at
the bottom even though both lines have the same length. Similarly, in the Müller-Lyer
illusion, when the fishhooks are pointed outwards, the line appears longer than when
the fishhooks are pointed inwards. In both cases, the lines that are represented as being
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Fig. 7 The Ponzo illusion (left): the top horizontal line appears longer than the bottom line, even though
they have the same length. The Müller-Lyer illusion (right): the line with the outward pointing fishhooks
appears to be longer than the line with the inward pointing fishhooks, even though the lines have the same
length
further away from us appear longer than the lines that are represented as being closer
to us.
Whereas normal perceivers fail to accurately judge the two-dimensional extent of
the lines in the two illusions, D.M. effortlessly judged the lines to be of equal length.
D.M. made accurate judgments in the two illusions because he didn’t experience the
lines as located in depth at some distance from himself. When the lines are seen as lying
in the picture plane, they are naturally interpreted as having the same length. Unlike
normal perceivers, D.M. is thus making a judgment about the extent of the lines without
extracting three-dimensional structure from the illusory figures. This shows that D.M.
had conscious access to two-dimensional information about the illusory figures, a
finding that goes against Prinz’s claim that only intermediate-level representations,
which provide information about depth, have the kind of integration that is required
for conscious access.
Interestingly, Turnbull et al. (2004) found that while D.M.’s ability to recognize
drawn objects was severely compromised, he had retained some ability to recognize
real objects on the basis of richer surface-based cues absent from line drawings, such as
information about texture and shading. They take these findings to support the view that
object recognition can be accomplished on the basis of two-dimensional information
alone. This suggests that many cognitive tasks can be accomplished without depth
perception as long as surface-based cues are made available to working memory,
contrary to what AIR predicts.
5 Integration is not suﬃcient for consciousness
Having challenged the claim made by our three target theories that integration is
necessary for consciousness, we now turn our attention to the question of whether
information integration is sufficient for consciousness:
(D) Sufficiency of Integration: Necessarily, if mental state S’s representational
content is integrated, then S is conscious (I ⇒ C).
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According to (D), if mental state S’s representational content is integrated, then S is
conscious. So, if there are cases of mental states with integrated content that fail to be
conscious, then (D) is false.
The current evidence suggests that unconscious processing is possible both at per-
ceptual and semantic levels (for reviews, see e.g. Köhler and Moscovitch 1997; Shacter
et al. 1998; Brogaard 2011a; Brogaard and Gatzia 2017). Take, for example, studies of
hemispatial neglect, a neurological disorder that occurs as a result of unilateral brain
damage (Driver and Vuilleumier 2001). It is characterized by an absence of visual
awareness of stimuli located on the opposite side of the lesion: if the lesion is on the
right, the patient has no visual awareness of the left side of the visual scene. Hem-
ineglect also results in a failure to perform actions that would normally be directed
toward the neglected hemifield, such as orienting behaviors and exploratory search.
Many neglect patients behave as though half of their surroundings is missing (Driver
and Vuilleumier 2001). Despite the lack of conscious awareness of stimuli in the
neglected hemifield, priming measures indicate a considerable amount of processing
of the neglected stimuli at perceptual and semantic levels (McGlinchey-Berroth et al.
1993). Hemineglect cases, as we will see, provides evidence against the sufficiency of
information integration for consciousness.
5.1 Evidence against IIT from hemineglect
Before we discuss the evidence any further, another note about our assumptions is
in order. When we talk about hemispatial neglect and the empirical data collected
from the patients, we assume that the report of no conscious awareness on the part
of the subject is very good (though, once again, not incontrovertible) evidence of no
conscious experience. When patients say they do not experience one half of their visual
field, we, once again, take them at face value.
In a well-known study of hemispatial neglect, patients were presented with two
pictures of a house (Marshall and Halligan 1988). One showed an ordinary house,
whereas the other depicted a house with one side being on fire. The burning half of the
house was presented to the neglected hemifield. While the patients reported seeing no
difference between the two pictures, they consistently picked the picture that depicted
the ordinary house, not the half burned house, as the house they would prefer to live in.
This suggests that while the burning side of the house was not consciously processed
by the patients, they nevertheless were able to detect the information presented to the
neglected hemifield and direct their behavior accordingly.
The initial interpretation of the results was that the hemineglect patients can uncon-
sciously process the neglected stimuli at the level of meaning. That is, it was thought
that they have the capacity to unconsciously recognize what the meaning of the flames
shown in the picture is. However, failure to replicate the result in subsequent studies
encouraged a rival interpretation, according to which the patients’ responses were
based on relatively low-level features of the stimuli such as symmetry (Bisiach and
Rusconi 1990). While this interpretation is consistent with the view that information in
the neglected hemifield can be unconsciously detected and integrated into a conscious
percept, the rival interpretation of the study weakens its evidential status.
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A more recent study suggests that semantic features can indeed be unconsciously
detected by patients with hemispatial neglect (Kanne 2002). The results of this study
revealed that when a word was shown to the neglected field, the subject’s performance
on the subsequent search task was improved when the neglected word shared semantic
affinity with the items searched for, but not when the word showed orthographic or
phonetic similarity. For example, when the word presented to the neglected hemifield
was ‘dog’, the neglect subjects did better in a task requiring them to find animal-
related words than when the word shown to the neglected hemifield was semantically
unrelated to the task (even when the primed word looked or sounded like the target
word). This suggests that the subjects were able to unconsciously process and take
into account semantic features of the stimuli.
Even emotional features of stimuli are processed unconsciously in neglect patients.
Vuilleumier et al. (2002) found that when a fearful face was presented to a subject’s
neglected hemifield, the face still evoked responses in the parts of the brain implicated
in emotional processing, in contrast to neutral faces. Furthermore, the neural activity
in these brain areas was not affected by whether the patient reported being aware of the
face or not. The brain responded in the same way irrespective of whether the stimulus
was consciously seen. These results suggest that emotional features of the stimulus
were processed by the patient even in the absence of visual awareness of said stimulus.
The hemineglect studies thus demonstrate that perceptual, semantic, and affective
features can be combined into an integrative whole without the integrated information
entering the hemineglect patients’ consciousness. The data from hemineglect thus
present a challenge to IIT.
Proponents of IIT might insist that unconsciously detected information is not inte-
grated to a degree that suffices for consciousness to emerge. However, this sort of
reply rests on the implausible assumption that only a rather high degree of integra-
tion suffices for conscious experience. This, however, runs counter to the claim that
consciousness is gradable. If consciousness comes in degrees, as IIT argues, then we
should expect information to be unconscious only when it lacks integration or has a
very low degree of integration.
Another way for IIT to defuse the objection is to insist that hemineglect patients
do not lack consciousness in the neglected hemifield but simply have a diminished
degree of consciousness in the neglected hemifield. This suggestion is reminiscent of
the debate about whether blindsight patients who report lacking awareness in their
blind field really do lack awareness in their blind field.18 Most blindsight researchers
who draw a distinction between type 1 and type 2 blindsight argue that subjects with
type 2 blindsight can detect certain features visually in spite of having extensive V1
damage that results in abnormally low levels of visual consciousness in contralesional
regions of the visual field. Subjects with type 1 blindsight, by contrast, have the capacity
to detect certain features visually in spite of having extensive V1 damage that results
in cortical blindness in contralesional regions of the visual field.
There is considerable evidence for the view that subjects with type 2 blindsight
have spared visual capacities in spite of the abnormally low levels of visual conscious-
18 See the special journal issue published in Consciousness and Cognition, 2015 Mar. volume 32. Edited
by Robert Foley and Bob Kentridge.
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Fig. 8 A Kanizsa-style illusion
consisting of four spatially
separate, occluded black circles
(pacman-like shapes) gives rise
to an illusory experience of a
bright white rectangle
ness. Patient report ‘seeing something’, ‘seeing something move’, ‘seeing something
occluded behind a dark shadow’, and so on (Macpherson 2015; Brogaard 2015). How-
ever, unlike patients with type 2 blindsight, hemineglect patients do not make reports
indicative of spared consciousness in the neglected hemifield. Absent any reports of
spared consciousness in hemineglect, the envisaged objection lacks credibility.
5.2 Evidence against IIT from amodal completion
There are other ways in which the phenomenon of hemineglect turns out to threaten
the claim that information integration is sufficient for consciousness. While hemine-
glect patients fail to be conscious of low-level features of stimuli presented to them
in the neglected hemifield, these features can nonetheless contribute to the overall
phenomenology of their experience. In Vuilleumier and Landis’s well-known study
(1998), for example, hemineglect patients were asked to bisect (i.e., mark the midpoint
of) Kanizsa-style figures similar to the one below.
To neurotypical perceivers, the display in Fig. 8 visually appears as a white rectangle
hovering over four black circles. This appearance is generated via a perceptual process
known as ‘amodal completion’ (Michotte et al. 1991). Although the only objects in
Fig. 8 capable of making an imprint on the retina are the four pacman-like shapes, the
process of amodal completion completes or ‘fills in’ the unseen parts of the stimulus to
yield a unified, holistic image. The visually detected information from the pacman-like
shapes is thus integrated with amodally supplied information to yield an experience
of an integrated whole consisting of four black discs occluded by a white rectangle.
The process of amodal completion also seems to integrate visually detected infor-
mation with information provided amodally in hemineglect patients (Vuilleumier and
Landis 1998). Hemineglect patients bisected Fig. 8 as if it were a rectangle covering
four black discs, even though they denied experiencing the two black pacman-like
shapes on the left (see Fig. 9). Information from the neglected side (i.e., information
that the subjects deny experiencing) thus seems to contribute to how the figure is
consciously seen.
This suggests that hemineglect patients are able to unconsciously detect the features
of stimuli presented to the neglected field and integrate them with consciously detected
features. This integration results in a conscious percept of the sort depicted in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9 The part of the image from
Fig. 8 as consciously
experienced by hemineglect
patients. We have included the
thin lines on the right in order to
illustrate how a hemineglect
patient seems to be experiencing
the illusion despite not
consciously seeing the
pacman-like shapes on the right
Unconscious stimuli in the contralesional hemifield thus make a direct contribution to
the conscious experience that emerges. Again, if the axioms fail to adequately capture
the phenomenology of experience, then the postulates will also fail to capture how
they are implemented by the brain.
One possible objection here is that since there is a phenomenological difference
between Figs. 8 and 9 (that is, the right-hand side discs are experienced in the former but
not in the latter), these experiments (Vuilleumier and Landis 1998) show the opposite
of what we are claiming.19 Namely, that the lack of integration (of information about
the right-hand side discs) results in the corresponding lack of phenomenal experience
(of the right-hand side discs).
However, our contention is that the way the right-hand side discs contribute to
experience is not merely by showing up on the right-hand side of the image. They
make another contribution as well: they are inducing the illusory contours of the white
rectangle. In other words, it seems to us that there is something it is like to see the
illusory rectangle hovering above all the discs and, whatever that experience is like,
the discs on the right play a constitutive role in determining its phenomenology. That
indicates that had the discs not been there, it is possible that the experience of the
rectangle would not be the same (in fact, it would not be an experience of a figure
hovering above the discs at all). This can be easily seen by covering the two discs on
the right—no rectangle is visible then. If this is line of thought is on the right track,
then the discs on the right do play a role in the experience of the rectangle or in what
it’s like to seem to see the rectangle.
Results of the bisection experiment on the hemineglect patients, by contrast, show
something unexpected. This is because the patients are able to pinpoint the midpoint
of the illusory rectangle despite not reporting seeing the right-hand side of the image.
This is evidence that there is something in the subjects’ experience in virtue of which
the white rectangle appears to them in some manner, which enables them to bisect it
correctly. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the “something” appears to be
the discs on the right. It follows that the discs somehow determine what the subjects’
experience is like even though they are not a part of the subjects’ (reported) experience.
19 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this objection.
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One natural way of expressing this would be to say that the information about the
discs on the right is processed together or is integrated with the information about the
discs on the left yielding an experience whose phenomenology we try to capture in
Fig. 9. At the very least, what we try to show with Fig. 9 is that the phenomenology of
the hemineglect subjects’ experience of the display is not simply that of seeing Fig. 8
without the discs on the right. In addition, whatever the phenomenal difference is, it
is constituted by the contribution from the two discs to the overall phenomenology. If
this interpretation of the experimental results is on the right track, then we have a case
where unconsciously processed information is integrated with consciously processed
information to yield an experience that couldn’t have been what it is like without
integrating unconscious information.
In sum, the aggregate of the evidence presented above suggests that, contrary to
what IIT says, information integration can occur in the absence of consciousness.
Hence, information integration is not sufficient for consciousness.
6 Conclusion
Empirical psychology offers a wealth of insights into philosophical theories of mind
and consciousness. Here we considered only a small fraction of empirical data relevant
to such theories. We discussed research that sheds light on the nature of consciousness
and examined what consequences the results of this research have for three target
theories of consciousness that all put great emphasis on integration. The empirical
evidence, we argued, shows that information integration is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for consciousness. Our arguments do not, however, aim to show that integration
doesn’t play a central role in theories of consciousness. Indeed, our conclusion is con-
sistent with various hypotheses about consciousness including the hypothesis that the
function, or role, of consciousness is to integrate information as well as the hypothesis
that consciousness facilitates integration (which is what Shea and Frith (2016) suggest
in light of their criticism of IIT). But while the exact nature of the interrelation between
consciousness and information integration is a fascinating subject worthy of further
exploration, the promise of a philosophical explanation of consciousness in terms of
information integration remains unfulfilled.
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